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FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
 
 Respondent Breidy Maria Cruz Lamothe removed her minor child, JINC, from his home 
in Honduras and brought him to the United States. JINC’s father, Petitioner Carlos Ismael Nunez 
Bardales, filed a Petition under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction (“the Convention”) seeking the return of JINC. On August 13, 2019, the Court held a 
bench trial on the Petition, after which the parties were instructed to file proposed findings of fact 
and conclusions of law. Those proposed findings of fact were filed on September 11, 2019.  
Having reviewed the parties’ proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, the record, 
the exhibits received in evidence, and the testimony of the witnesses, after considering their 
interests and demeanor, the Court enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
Except where the Court discusses different testimony on a specific issue, any contrary testimony 
on a specific matter has been rejected in favor of the specific fact found. Further, the Court omits 
from its recitation facts that it deems to be immaterial to the issues presented. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
 Respondent Breidy Maria Cruz Lamothe (“Respondent”) and Carlos Ismael Nunez 
Bardales (“Petitioner”) are both Honduran citizens. After a period of dating, Petitioner and 
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Respondent had a child together, JINC, who was born on July 21, 2015. Petitioner, Respondent, 
and JINC lived together in San Pedro Sula, Honduras after JINC’s birth. In February 2017, 
Petitioner and Respondent broke up, and moved into different homes. JINC resided with 
Respondent; however, Respondent dropped JINC off at Petitioner’s home five days a week while 
Respondent worked.  
 In July 2017, Respondent told Petitioner that she was taking JINC on a vacation to visit her 
sister in Catacamas Olancho, Honduras. Respondent actually planned to remove JINC to the 
United States. Respondent and JINC entered the United States on July 14, 2017, via the land border 
between the United States and Mexico and they arrived in Nashville, Tennessee on July 29, 2017.  
During this time, Petitioner became concerned when Respondent stopped responding to his calls 
and text messages. Respondent eventually texted Petitioner, informing him that she had taken JINC 
to the United States. JINC was two years old at the time. On July 24, 2017, Petitioner sought 
assistance from the Honduran Central Authority and submitted a Hague application for return of 
the child to the United States Department of State. (Doc. No. 1-5). On July 2, 2018, Petitioner filed 
a Petition for Return of Minor Child to Petitioner (Doc. No. 1) under the Convention, asserting 
that Respondent wrongfully removed JINC from Honduras and seeking JINC’s prompt return.  
 The Court held a bench trial on the matter on August 13, 2019. Prior to trial, the parties 
stipulated to the applicability of the Convention and also stipulated to the following facts: (1) JINC 
is under the age of sixteen; (2) JINC’s habitual residence at the time of removal was Honduras; (3) 
Respondent and JINC entered the United States on July 14, 2017, via the land border between the 
United States and Mexico, and Respondent did not tell the Petitioner she had removed the child 
from Honduras; (4) Petitioner filed his Petition within one year of his knowledge of the wrongful 
removal; (5) Petitioner is the father of JINC. (Doc. No. 38 at 3).  
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 Each party was represented by counsel at the bench trial.1 The only two witnesses at trial 
were Petitioner and Respondent. Their respective accounts of their relationship, and of Petitioner’s 
involvement in JINC’s life, differ greatly from one another. Petitioner maintained that after the 
parties stopped living together, they shared equal time with JINC and he financially supported, 
cooked for, fed, bathed, diapered, clothed, played with, read to, and taught JINC. Respondent 
testified that Petitioner was an angry and aggressive person who stalked her and pulled a loaded 
firearm on her while JINC was in the room. Respondent also testified that after the couple 
separated, Petitioner stopped providing any care to JINC, financially or otherwise. Although 
Respondent admitted that she did drop JINC off at Petitioner’s house while she worked, she 
testified that it was her belief that a babysitter or Petitioner’s mother, rather than Petitioner, 
watched JINC while he was there.  
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
I. The Convention  
In 1980, at the Hague Conference on Private International Law,  twenty-nine states 
(“Contracting States”) convened and enacted the Hague Convention in order to accomplish the 
following objectives: (1) “to secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or 
retained in any Contracting State”; and (2) “to ensure that rights of custody and of access under 
the law of one Contracting State are effectively respected in other Contracting States.” Convention 
art. 1. The United States and Honduras are both signatories to the Hague Convention. Congress 
ratified and implemented the Convention by enacting the International Child Abduction Remedies 
Act (“ICARA”). The Convention and ICARA seek to “preserve the status quo and to deter parents 
                                                          
1 The Court understands that counsel were representing their respective clients on a no-fee or reduced-fee basis. 
Counsel are to be commended for their advocacy in this case, whereby they made a substantial contribution to the 
administration of justice under the principles of the Hague Convention.  
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from crossing international boundaries in search of a more sympathetic court.” Friedrich v. 
Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 1400 (6th Cir. 1993) (hereinafter “Friedrich I”) (citation omitted). 
This Court “has jurisdiction to decide the merits of an abduction claim, but not the merits 
of the underlying custody dispute.” Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1063–64 (6th Cir. 1996) 
(hereinafter “Friedrich II”) (citing Convention, Article 19). The sole issue is whether a child has 
been wrongfully removed from his or her habitual residence. Whallon v. Lynn, 230 F.3d 450, 455 
(1st Cir. 2000). Article 3 of the Convention defines wrongful removal or retention as follows:  
The removal or the retention of a child is to be considered wrongful where— 
 
(a) [the retention of the child] is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an 
institution or any other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the State in which the 
child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; and 
 
(b) at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised, either jointly or 
alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention. 
 
Convention art. 3. If the Court determines that the removal was wrongful, and that no exception 
applies, then the Court “shall order the return of the child forthwith.” Id. at art. 12. 
 II. Evidentiary Issue 
First the Court must resolve an evidentiary issue with respect to Petitioner’s Exhibit 6. 
Petitioner’s Exhibit 6 contains excerpts of the Honduran family code in Spanish (“the Spanish 
version”) and an English translation of those excerpts (“the English version”). At trial, Respondent 
objected to Petitioner’s proposed Exhibit 6 on the ground that it was not properly authenticated. 
Respondent also complained of grammatically incorrect sentences in the English version of the 
Code. The Court instructed the federal court-certified interpreter to conduct an impromptu reading 
into the record of an English translation of the Spanish version of Petitioner’s Exhibit 6, and 
subsequently ordered Petitioner to submit post-trial filings with respect to authenticating the 
exhibit.  
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“The language of the Convention [ ] authorizes courts to ‘take notice directly of the law of 
[ . . . ] the State of the habitual residence of the child, without recourse to the specific procedures 
for the proof of that law or for the recognition of foreign decisions which would otherwise be 
applicable.’” March v. Levine, 136 F. Supp. 2d 831, 834 (M.D. Tenn. 2000) (citing Convention, 
art. 14), aff’d, 249 F.3d 462 (6th Cir. 2001). Additionally, under ICARA, no authentication of 
documents or information included with a petition under the Convention “shall be required in order 
for the . . . document[] or information to be admissible in court.” 42 U.S.C. § 11605.  
Relying on the above-mentioned principles, district courts often take judicial notice of the 
law of the state of habitual residence without requiring authentication. See De La Riva v. Soto, 183 
F. Supp. 3d 1182, 1196 n.15 (M.D. Fla. 2016) (explaining that during the bench trial the district 
court overruled respondent’s objection that the translated excerpts from the Civil Code for the 
State of Guanajuato were not authenticated because pursuant to ICARA and the Hague 
Convention, a court is authorized to take judicial notice of foreign law without requiring proper 
authentication); Guerrero v. Oliveros, 119 F. Supp. 3d 894, 908 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (taking “judicial 
notice of the translated excerpts of the Civil Code for the State of Jalisco, Mexico, provided by 
Petitioner.”); Seaman v. Peterson, 762 F. Supp. 2d 1363, 1379 (M.D. Ga. 2011), aff’d, 766 F.3d 
1252 (11th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he Court takes judicial notice of the translated excerpts of the Civil 
Code for the State of Jalisco, Mexico[.]”).  
Although Respondent’s concerns regarding that accuracy of the English translation in 
Petitioner’s Exhibit 6 are valid ones; here, those concerns are sufficiently alleviated here. When 
comparing Petitioner’s Exhibit 6 with other translations of the same law, including translations 
used by other federal courts, the Court observes that any differences in the translation are trivial. 
In fact, comparing Petitioner’s Exhibit 6 with two other district court’s recitation of the pertinent 
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Honduran law in Hague Convention cases, the translations all are exactly the same. See Mendieta 
Chirinos v. Umanzor, No. 3:18-cv-2668-M, 2019 WL 2287975, at *5 (N.D. Tex. May 29, 2019) 
(discussing translation of the Honduran Family Code articles 101, 186, 187, and 191); Orellana v. 
Cartagena, No. 3:16-cv-444-CCS, 2017 WL 5586374, at *6 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 20, 2017) 
(discussing translation of the Honduran Family Code articles 109, 186, and 187). Moreover, as 
noted, the court-certified interpreter translated the Spanish version into English on the record 
during the bench trial. The discrepancies between  that English translation and the English version 
Petitioner’s Exhibit 6 are insubstantial and reflect mere differences in phrasing rather than 
differences in the actual substantive meaning. Accordingly, the Court judicially notices the 
authenticity of Petitioner’s Exhibit 6 and will use the Honduran law as translated in Petitioner’s 
Exhibit 6 to determine whether Petitioner proved his prima facie case.2 
III. Petitioner’s Prima Facie Case  
To make out a prima facie case of wrongful removal, the Petitioner must show, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that (1) JINC’s habitual residence was Honduras at the time of the 
removal or retention; (2) the removal or retention was in breach of Petitioner’s custody rights under 
the laws of Honduras; and (3) Petitioner was exercising those rights at the time of the removal or 
retention. Friedrich I, 983 F.2d at 1400. If Petitioner can make this showing, then JINC is “to be 
promptly returned unless one of the narrow exceptions set forth in the convention applies.” 42 
U.S.C. § 11601(a)(4). The parties have stipulated that JINC’s habitual residence at the time of 
removal was Honduras for the purposes of the Convention. (Doc. No. 38 at 3). Accordingly, the 
issues before the Court are: (1) whether JINC’s removal was in breach of Petitioner’s custody 
                                                          
2 At the bench trial, the Court postponed ruling on the admissibility of Petitioner’s Exhibit 6 and allowed Petitioner to 
file a post-trial brief regarding the admissibility of Petitioner’s Exhibit 6. The Court now deems Petitioner’s Exhibit 6 
admitted.  
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rights under the laws of Honduras; and, if so, (2) whether Petitioner was exercising his custody 
rights at the time of removal.  
i. Whether JINC’s Removal Breached Petitioner’s Rights of Custody. 
Petitioner must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that JINC’s removal was in 
violation of Petitioner’s custody rights as defined by Honduran law. See Convention, art. 3. “The 
Convention defines ‘rights of custody’ to ‘include rights relating to the care of the person of the 
child and, in particular, the right to determine the child’s place of residence.’” Abbott v. Abbott, 
560 U.S. 1, 8 (2010) (quoting Convention, art. 5(a)). Rights of custody arise “by operation of law 
or by reason of a judicial or administrative decision, or by reason of an agreement having legal 
effect under the law of that State.” Convention, art. 3. Further, breach of rights of custody are 
determined by the law of the State in which the child was a habitual resident immediately before 
retention. Id. 
Here, Petitioner must (and does) rely on operation of Honduran law, rather than any 
agreement or judicial or administrative decision. Specifically, he relies on Article 187 of the 
Honduran Family Code, which provides that “parental authority belongs to both parents jointly. 
However, it will exercise one of them3 when it is conferred by the court or the other was in 
impossibility to exercise it.” (Doc. No. 1-3 at 1). “Parents in the exercise of parental authority have 
the right to exercise guidance, care and correction of their children, and provide them in line with 
the evolution of their physical and mental faculties, the direction and guidance that is appropriate 
for their development.” (Id. at 2 (translating Honduran Family Code, Art. 191)).  “If parental 
authority is exercised by both parents, the written authorization of the other is required if just one 
parent is traveling with the child during the trip.” (Id. (translating Honduran Family Code, Art. 
                                                          
3 The Court believes, based on the context, that “it will exercise one of them” actually should be construed as, “one 
parent alone may exercise parental authority.”  
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101)). Therefore, “Honduran law provides that, when both parents exercise parental authority, each 
parent has a ne exeat right: a right to consent before the other parent can take the child out of the 
country.” Mendieta Chirinos, 2019 WL 2887975, at *5. “A ne exeat right is a right of custody 
under the Convention.” Abbott, 560 U.S. at 10. 
In Abbott, a Chilean court granted the mother daily control of the child and granted the 
father visitation. Id. at 6. A Chilean statute provided that once a parent is granted visitation rights, 
a ne exeat right is conferred that requires a parent to obtain permission from the other parent before 
removing the child from the country. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court explained that “[t]he Convention 
defines ‘rights of custody’ to ‘include rights relating to the care of the person of the child and, in 
particular, the right to determine the child’s place of residence.’ Art. 5(a), ibid. Mr. Abbott’s ne 
exeat right gives him both the joint ‘right to determine the child’s place of residence” and joint 
“rights relating to the care of the person of the child.’” Id. at 10-11. Therefore, the Supreme Court 
held that Mr. Abbott’s ne exeat right was a right of custody as defined by the Convention.. Id. at 
10.  
In Mendieta Chirinos, a district court examined the Honduran Family Code and determined 
that because the Code requires written authorization if just one parent is traveling with the child 
outside of Honduras, the Code provides a “ne exeat right, which is a right of custody under the 
Hague Convention.”  2019 WL 2287975, at *7. In Orellana, another district court reviewed the 
Honduran Family Code and explained that because “Respondent did not receive a custody order 
from any Honduras court granting full custody . . . . Petitioner is the Child’s father [and] the Court 
finds that he has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that under Honduran law, both he and 
Respondent have custody rights over the child.” 2017 WL 5586374, at *6. 
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As noted above, under the Honduran code, “parental authority belongs to both parents 
jointly. However, it will exercise one of them when it is conferred by the court or the other was in 
impossibility to exercise it.” (Doc. No. 1-3 at 1). Here, the parties stipulated that Petitioner was 
the father of the child. Moreover, there is nothing in the record that indicates a Honduran court 
granted full custody to Respondent, and it was not impossible for Petitioner to exercise parental 
authority; indeed, as determined below, he did in fact exercise his parental authority. Therefore, 
Petitioner possessed parental authority jointly with Respondent. “If parental authority is exercised 
by both parents, the written authorization of the other is required if just one parent is traveling with 
the child during the trip.” (Id. (translating Honduran Family Code, Art. 101)).  The Supreme Court 
has held that such a ne exeat right is a right of custody as defined by the Convention. Abbott, 560 
U.S. at 10. Therefore, Petitioner possessed rights of custody over JINC at the time of his removal 
from Honduras. The parties also stipulated that Respondent removed JINC to the United States on 
July 14, 2017, without informing Petitioner she was removing the child from Honduras. Because 
Respondent did not receive Petitioner’s written authorization before removing JINC from 
Honduras, JINC’s removal was in breach of Petitioner’s custody rights. Therefore, Petitioner has 
proved by a preponderance of the evidence that JINC’s removal was in breach of his custody rights 
granted by Honduran law. 
ii. Whether Petitioner Exercised His Custody Rights.  
Next, Petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was exercising his 
rights of custody at the time of the wrongful removal. Convention art. 3(b). Once a petitioner has 
established that he or she has custody rights under the laws of the country of habitual residence, 
courts must “liberally” find the exercise of those custody rights. Friedrich II, 78 F.3d at 1065. This 
liberal approach to finding whether a petitioner exercised his or her custody rights helps courts to 
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refrain from addressing the merits of the underlying custody dispute and “completely avoid [] the 
question of whether [Petitioner] exercised the custody rights well or badly.” Id. at 1066; 42 U.S.C. 
§ 11601(b)(4) (limiting the scope of U.S. Courts to determining “rights under the Convention and 
not the merits of any underlying child custody claims.”).4 Therefore, courts may “liberally find 
‘exercise’ whenever a party with de jure custody rights keeps, or seeks to keep, any sort of regular 
contact with his or her child.” Id. at 1065. The Sixth Circuit has further explained:  
[i]f a person has valid custody rights to a child under the law of the country of the 
child’s habitual residence, that person cannot fail to “exercise” those custody rights 
under the Hague Convention short of acts that constitute clear and unequivocal 
abandonment of the child. Once it determines that the parent actually exercised 
custody rights in any manner, the court should stop—completely avoiding the 
question whether the parent exercised those rights well or badly. These matters go 
to the merits of the custody dispute and are, therefore, beyond the subject matter 
jurisdiction of the federal court.  
 
Id. at 1066 (emphasis added).  
At trial, Petitioner and Respondent offered conflicting testimony with respect to the amount 
of involvement of Petitioner in JINC’s life. Respondent does not appear to contest that Petitioner 
exercised his custody rights until the end of their relationship. After the relationship ended, 
however, Respondent testified that Petitioner stopped providing any care to JINC and refused to 
help with JINC’s expenses. She testified that she dropped JINC off at Petitioner’s house when she 
went to work five days a week, but contended that Petitioner’s mother or a babysitter, and not 
Petitioner, cared for JINC while he was there.  
On the other hand, Respondent testified he was very involved in JINC’s life, both prior to 
and after the relationship ended. Petitioner testified that he cared for JINC five days a week while 
Respondent was at work. Petitioner explained that he helped feed, bath, diaper, and cloth JINC. 
                                                          
4 This means, among other things, that a court should not find the absence of the exercise of rights of custody because 
the court is unimpressed with the manner in which, or the degree to which, those rights were being exercised. It is one 
thing to exercise rights in a lackluster, lazy or uninspired manner; it is quite another to not exercise them at all.  
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Additionally, he testified that he helped to financially support JINC. Although admitting that his 
mother and a babysitter did care for JINC when he had to work, he claimed he paid them for 
childcare.  
Although there are disputes regarding the extent of the care that Petitioner provided to 
JINC, there was no testimony from Petitioner or Respondent of acts that could constitute “clear 
and unequivocal abandonment” of JINC on the part of the Petitioner. Friedrich II, 78 F.3d at 1066. 
Respondent’s allegations of Petitioner’s lack of hands-on care for JINC is to no avail, because such 
allegations suggest something “short of acts that constitute clear and unequivocal abandonment.” 
Respondent testified that she dropped JINC off at Petitioner’s house five days a week. Even if 
Petitioner’s mother or a babysitter cared for JINC while he was at Petitioner’s house, it is obvious 
to the Court that Petitioner still intended to, and did, keep regular contact with JINC during this 
time. Additionally, as Respondent was at work while JINC was at Petitioner’s home, and thus, she 
could not know who was actually caring for JINC and to what extent. Petitioner’s intended 
continued contact with JINC is also illuminated by the fact that Petitioner contacted the Honduran 
central authority to obtain JINC’s return within days of JINC’s removal from Honduras. As noted 
above, the Sixth Circuit has instructed that courts may “liberally find ‘exercise’ whenever a party 
with de jure custody rights keeps, or seeks to keep, any sort of regular contact with his or her 
child.” Friedrich II, 78 F.3d at 1065.  Accordingly, the Court finds that Petitioner was exercising 
his custody rights at the time of removal.  
Accordingly, the Court finds that Petitioner has proved his prima facie case by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  
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IV. Respondent’s Affirmative Defenses 
The Court’s inquiry does not end upon finding wrongful removal. Once a petitioner has 
successfully established its prima facie case of wrongful removal, a court must determine whether 
the respondent has established that any of the Hague Convention’s affirmative defenses apply.  See 
42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(2); Friedrich II, 78 F.3d at 1067. These affirmative defenses are as follows: 
(1) the proceeding was commenced more than one year after the removal of the child; (2) the 
children have become settled in their new environment; (3) the person seeking return of the child 
consented to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal or retention; (4) there is a grave risk that 
the return of the children would expose them to physical or psychological harm; and (5) the return 
of the child “would not be permitted by the fundamental principles of the requested State relating 
to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.”5 See Convention arts. 13(a)–(b); 42 
U.S.C. §§ 11603(e)(2)(A)–(B). The Sixth Circuit has considered the affirmative defenses to be 
“narrow” and “not a basis for avoiding return of a child merely because the court believes it can 
better or more quickly resolve a dispute.” Freidrich II, 78 F.3d at 1067. “In fact, a federal court 
retains, and should use when appropriate, the discretion to return a child, despite the existence of 
a defense, if return would further the aims of the Convention.” Id. (citing Feder, 63 F.3d at 226).  
                                                          
5 In a portion of Respondent’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, she states “For the sake of 
Respondent’s life and the life of her child, this Court should not order the return of the child to Honduras, an extremely 
violent, crime-ridden country.” (Doc. No. 59 at 9). This statement does not support Respondent’s claim that return to 
Honduras would expose JINC to a grave risk of harm; that claim is based on the allegedly violent nature of Petitioner 
personally, not the general environment in Honduras. Rather, this statement appears made in support of Respondent’s 
affirmative defense that JINC’s “[r]eturn would conflict with fundamental principles of freedom and human rights in 
the United States.” (Doc. No. 22 at 4). This defense is reserved for “the rare occasion that return of a child would 
utterly shock the conscience of the court or offend all notions of due process.” U.S. State Dep’t Text & Legal Analysis, 
51 F. Reg. 10,494, 10,509 (Mar. 26, 1986). Respondent did not put on any evidence or expert testimony in support of 
this defense. Thus, she is far from meeting her burden to prove this defense by clear and convincing evidence. Thus, 
the Court will not rely on this defense to prevent return of JINC.  
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Here, Respondent raises two defenses: (1) there is a grave risk that returning JINC to 
Honduras would subject him to physical harm; and (2) Petitioner subsequently acquiesced in the 
retention of JINC in the United States. The Court will explore each defense in turn.  
i. Whether Return to Honduras Poses a Grave Risk to JINC. 
Respondent avers that even if Petitioner proves his prima facie case of wrongful removal, 
JINC should not be returned to Honduras because there is a grave risk that returning JINC would 
expose him to harm because of Petitioner’s prior violent actions.  
To prevail, Respondent must prove by clear and convincing evidence that there is a grave 
risk that returning JINC to Honduras “would expose the child to physical or psychological harm 
or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.” Convention, art. 13(b). The Sixth Circuit 
has adopted a “restrictive reading” of this exception. Friedrich II, 78 F.3d at 1068–69 (discussing 
international precedent that supports a “restrictive reading” of the grave harm exception); see also 
March, 136 F. Supp. at 844–846 (stating that “this exception is truly to be narrowly construed,” 
and courts that have found a grave risk of harm “have generally emphasized that there was clear 
and convincing evidence to support a finding that the parent seeking the return had seriously 
abused the child”). The Sixth Circuit has also “acknowledge[d] that courts in the abducted-from 
country are as ready and able as we are to protect children. If return to a country, or to the custody 
of a parent in that country, is dangerous, we can expect that country’s courts to respond 
accordingly.” Id. at 1067.  
At trial, Respondent testified that after she and Petitioner ended their relationship, 
Petitioner stalked her and threatened her. She testified that on one occasion, when JINC was in the 
room, Respondent pointed a loaded gun at her, and then at himself while threatening to commit 
suicide. Respondent also testified that on another occasion, Petitioner showed up at her place of 
Case 3:18-cv-00600   Document 61   Filed 10/25/19   Page 13 of 19 PageID #: 499
14 
 
employment and threatened to kill her and himself. She testified that she was in fear of returning 
to Honduras because of these incidences. Petitioner vehemently denies that he has ever pointed a 
gun at Respondent or threatened her. Moreover, Petitioner denied that he ever held a gun in front 
of his son and testified that he “would never do that.” Based on its observations during the hearing 
and its review of the evidence, the Court concludes that neither party’s version is appreciably more 
credible or less credible than the other party’s version. 
The Court finds that Respondent has not proved by clear and convincing evidence that 
returning JINC to Honduras “would expose the child or psychological harm[.]” Convention, art. 
13(b). Her only evidence of any threatening behavior on the part of Petitioner is her own testimony, 
which Petitioner’s testimony disputed. There was no other evidence, either through witness 
testimony, physical evidence, or documentary evidence such as text messages or a police report, 
that tends to corroborate Respondent’s testimony. This uncorroborated, hotly disputed testimony 
is simply not enough to satisfy Respondent’s burden of clear and convincing evidence.  
Furthermore, these two alleged instances of threatening behavior, even if credited, would 
not be enough to meet Respondent’s burden in demonstrating that returning JINC to Honduras 
exposes him to a grave risk of harm. Although Respondent testified that Petitioner threatened her, 
Respondent did not testify that Petitioner ever threatened or abused JINC. See Guevara, 180 F. 
Supp. 3d at 533 (finding that the defendant did not meet her burden to prove grave risk of harm to 
the child because “[w]hile defendant submits that plaintiff had an alcohol problem and abused her 
in the past, she does not allege that plaintiff abused the child.”). “To prevail on an Article 13(b) 
defense, there must be evidence of a grave risk of harm to [the] child, not solely to a parent or 
some other third party.” Acosta v. Acosta, No. CIV. 12-342 ADM/SER, 2012 WL 2178982, at *7 
(D. Minn. June 14, 2012) (citing Convention art. 13(b)); see also Charalambous v. Charalambous, 
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627 F.3d 462, 468 (1st Cir. 2010) (“The relevant inquiry is not whether there would be a grave 
risk of harm to [the child’s mother] if she returned to [the country of habitual residence]; rather, 
the grave risk inquiry goes to the children.”). The Court recognizes the possibility that abuse of a 
parent can result in a risk of harm to the abused parent’s child who is unfortunate enough to be in 
the vicinity when the abuse occurs; such a child is at risk of indirect and/or unintended harm 
attendant to the abuse of the parent. But here there has been no showing of any likelihood of such 
scenario were JINC to be returned—i.e., that long after Petitioner’s relationship with Respondent 
ended, he would abuse her,6 let alone abuse her with JINC in the vicinity so as to be himself at 
risk. Although Petitioner did allegedly point a loaded gun at Respondent while JINC was in the 
room, this action alone does not amount to one of the “extreme cases” in which the grave risk of 
harm defense may be found. See Cuellar v. Joyce, 596 F.3d 505, 508 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he court 
must return the abducted child to its country of habitual residence so that the courts of that country 
can determine custody. . . . [t]his policy of deterrence gives way to concern for the welfare of the 
child only in extreme cases.”) (emphasis added).   
Moreover, Respondent has not proven by clear and convincing evidence that the Honduran 
courts would be unwilling or incapable of protecting the child during the pendency of a custody 
hearing. Although Respondent testified that the police force in Honduras “doesn’t work”, this does 
not persuade the Court that Honduran courts are unable to protect JINC. As the Sixth Circuit 
explained, “[w]hen we trust the court system in the abducted-from country, the vast majority of 
claims of harm—those that do not rise to the level of gravity required by the Convention—
                                                          
6 With the relationship over, Petitioner presumably would be deprived of the circumstances abusers typically leverage 
to commit their atrocities: a private space where the abuser has access to the victim without the presence of another 
person capable (and desirous) of stopping or preventing the abuse. Even assuming Petitioner had, and took advantage 
of, such opportunities during the course of his intimate relationship with Respondent, that does not suggest he would 
have such opportunities long after their relationship ended.  
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evaporate.” Friedrich II, 78 F.3d at 1068. Indeed, the very fact that Honduras has been and remains 
a party to the Convention counsels against this Court accepting carte blanche an uncorroborated 
accusation that Honduran courts cannot protect children returned to Honduras pursuant to the 
Convention. The Court, therefore, does not find that Respondent has carried her burden of 
establishing by clear and convincing evidence that there is a grave risk to JINC if he is returned to 
Honduras.7 
ii. Whether Petitioner Subsequently Acquiesced to JINC’s Removal  
Respondent argues that Petitioner consented to or subsequently acquiesced in the wrongful 
retention of their child and that she should therefore be afforded the third of the foregoing 
affirmative defenses under Article 13. Petitioner argues that Respondent waived this defense 
because she did not raise it in her pleadings. Petitioner’s point is well-taken; nevertheless, even if 
the Court did not consider Respondent’s assertion of this affirmative defense as waived, she has 
not met her burden.  
 In order for her to prevail on this defense, Respondent must show by a preponderance of 
the evidence that Petitioner consented to or subsequently acquiesced to the child remaining in the 
United States. See Friedrich II, 78 F.3d at 1067 (citing Convention art. 13(a) and 42 U.S.C. § 
11603(e)(2)(B)). Here, the parties stipulated that “Respondent did not tell Petitioner that she had 
removed the child from Honduras.” (Doc. No. 38 at 3). And Petitioner sought assistance from the 
Honduran Central Authority within days of JINC’s removal. See Freier v. Freier, 969 F. Supp. 
                                                          
7 Because Respondent has not met her burden of demonstrating a grave risk of harm to JINC if he is returned to 
Honduras, the Court will not entertain Respondent’s request to require Petitioner to obtain a protective order from a 
Honduran court to ameliorate the grave risk of harm to JINC prior to ordering JINC’s return. (See Doc. No. 59 at 10-
11). The Ninth Circuit recently explained that although such “ unenforceable undertakings are generally disfavored” 
because such conditions imposed are unenforceable by a United States courts, it did “not think that international 
comity precludes district courts from ordering, where practicable, that one or both of the parties apply to courts in the 
country of habitual residence for any available relief that might ameliorate the grave risk of harm to the child.” Saada 
v Golan, 930 F.3d 533, 541 (2d Cir. 2019). Nevertheless, the Court will not impose any such order because the Court 
does not find that return of JINC to Honduras will place him in a grave risk of harm.  
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436, 444 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (finding no consent where, inter alia, petition was filed “within days” 
of wrongful removal). Accordingly, Petitioner did not consent to JINC’s removal from Honduras. 
Thus, Respondent argued at trial that Petitioner subsequently acquiesced to JINC remaining in the 
United States.  
“[A]cquiescence under the Convention requires either: an act or statement with the 
requisite formality, such as testimony in a judicial proceeding; a convincing written enunciation 
of rights; or a consistent attitude of acquiescence over a significant period of time.” Friedrich II, 
78 F.3d at 1070. “Subsequent acquiescence requires more than an isolated statement to a third-
party. Each of the words and actions of a parent during the separation are not to be scrutinized for 
a possible waiver of custody rights.” Id. (citation omitted).8 
Here, Respondent’s evidence of Petitioner’s subsequent acquiesce was ambiguous at best. 
At trial, Respondent displayed text messages, in which Petitioner responded with a “thumbs-up” 
emoji to Respondent’s statement that she had made it to the United States. Respondent maintained 
that the “thumbs-up” meant Petitioner was okay with JINC remaining in the United States. 
Petitioner contended that the “thumbs-up” meant that Respondent should enjoy her mother’s 
company, and did not imply that he was okay with JINC remaining in the United States. As other 
evidence of Petitioner’s subsequent acquiesce, Respondent read into the record text messages in 
which Petitioner texted Respondent that his plan was to work hard, get his papers, and come to the 
United States. Petitioner testified (with adequate credibility, in the Court’s view) that he meant 
here that he intended to come to the United States not to live in the United States with his son, but 
rather to retrieve his son, and return to Honduras.  In another series of text messages, Petitioner 
                                                          
8 The Court sees no reason why this principle should not likewise apply, albeit perhaps with somewhat lesser force, 
to isolated statements that were made not to a third-party but to Respondent.  
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responded “Perfect” to Respondent’s text messages that JINC “would be an important man here 
[in the United States].” 
This emoji and these text messages neither (1) are “statement[s] with the requisite 
formality” that demonstrate Petitioner’s acquiescence;9 nor (2) display a “consistent attitude of 
acquiescence over a significant period of time.” Id. These communications simply do not show, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, Petitioner’s subsequent acquiescence to JINC remaining in 
the United States, especially in light of Petitioner’s consistent efforts to have JINC returned to 
Honduras. See Friedrich II, 78 F.3d at 1070 (“He has resolutely sought custody of his son since 
that time. It is by these acts, not his casual statements to third parties, that we will determine 
whether or not he acquiesced to the retention of his son in America.”).  
Although Petitioner initially sought assistance from the Honduran Central Authority prior 
to sending these communications, he continued his efforts while JINC remained with his mother 
in the United States, including by retaining counsel, and eventually filing a Petition in this Court. 
Petitioner’s persistence demonstrates that his communications did not reflect a change in 
Petitioner’s attitude toward JINC remaining in the United States. Certainly, even despite the text 
messages, Petitioner did not display a “consistent attitude of acquiescence over a significant period 
of time.” Id.; see also Zarate v. Perez, No. 96–C50394, 1996 WL 734613, *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 23, 
1996) (“These efforts [in contacting the Central Authority of Mexico] by petitioner continued 
during the time the child was being retained in this country and eventually led to petitioner 
retaining legal counsel and filing suit under the Act. All of this conduct exhibits anything but a 
consent to, or acquiescence in, the retention of the child.”).  
                                                          
9 In the Court’s view, emojis and text messages are widely perceived to be, and in fact are, generally very casual 
communications, strikingly devoid of formality.  
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Accordingly, the Court finds that Respondent has not met her burden to prove Petitioner 
acquiesced JINC remaining in the United States by a preponderance of the evidence.10  
V. Conclusion 
For the above-mentioned reasons, the Court will GRANT the Petition and ORDER that 
JINC, the three-year-old son of Petitioner and Respondent, be returned to his habitual residence in 
San Pedro Sula, Honduras.  




UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
 
                                                          
10 Respondent requests that the Court refrain from issuing an order returning JINC to Honduras until a Honduran court 
can determine whether Petitioner was actually exercising parental authority at the time of removal. (See Doc. No. 59 
at 9-10 (citing Convention, art. 15)). Article 15 of the Convention provides: 
 
The judicial or administrative authorities of a Contracting State may, prior to the making of an order 
for the return of the child, request that the applicant obtain from the authorities of the State of the 
habitual residence of the child a decision or other determination that the removal or retention was 
wrongful within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention, where such a decision or determination 
may be obtained in that State. The Central Authorities of the Contracting States shall so far as 
practicable assist applicants to obtain such a decision or determination. 
 
Convention, art 15 (emphasis added). Nevertheless, the Court also has an obligation under the Convention to make an 
expeditious decision. According to the record, no proceedings regarding custody of JINC have been initiated in 
Honduras. The Court concludes that a Honduran court, due to its lack of experience or familiarity with this matter, 
likely would both need some time to get up to speed and be no better situated to rule (at a date even further removed 
from the relevant events) on the issue of exercise of parental authority. Therefore, the Court declines Respondent’s 
request to stay this matter until a Honduran court determines whether Petitioner was exercising his custody rights.  
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